


UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



STUDY GUIDE



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THE LUMUN SPIRIT

The LUMUN Spirit was first introduced as a concept at LUMUN XV. It sought to reintroduce a recognition of the most essential components of MUN culture; imparting a sense of responsibility accepting that the onus is on us to be the forerunners of change. The fundamental premise of a Model UN is to develop our understanding of the issues and conflicts in the world as a collective, and to connect individuals with vastly differing life experiences with each other. The pursuit of quantitative success and accolades has fermented a tradition of MUN being a space mired in hostility and distrust. The LUMUN Spirit is our continuing effort to inculcate empathy, compassion, understanding and diplomacy within this competitive activity.

As we proceed on our journey of revamping Model UN, the LUMUN Spirit is an idea that we aspire to incorporate in the entire LUMUN experience: from the Host Team, to an expectation that we will have from the delegates as well. It is not an abstract concept – it is a vision that should embody the behavior of every delegate in every committee. Inside the committee or out; the enthusiasm to meet other people, present arguments in a true ambassadorial manner and the idea to enjoy LUMUN should never be forgotten. In this very essence we will be able to represent what it means to simulate a true world model; an actual representation of the United Nations. We continue to strive and ensure that the outlook of LUMUN XVIII is to not be an average Model UN conference anymore.

And so, leadership and prowess within a committee is not characterized by exerting one's overbearing presence on others or by alienating and excluding others from discussion. They manifest in a delegate's ability to engage with others, help them play their part in the committee, and to facilitate the committee as a whole to engage in a fruitful and informative debate. This includes actions as simple as maintaining a moderate temperament, inviting others' input and operating with honesty and respect. The LUMUN Society invites you to understand what it means to be an ambassador of a country and represent its foreign policy means to employ collaboration alongside reasoned argumentation to press forward with that actor's policy agenda.



LUMUN21

Secretary General



Laiba Noor Abid

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of our Secretariat and Staff, it is with great joy and immense pride that I extend a heartfelt invitation to you for the 21st edition of LUMS Model United Nations (LUMUN). This milestone marks not only a continued legacy of excellence in diplomacy at LUMS but extends beyond! It is both an honor and a privilege to carry forward this tradition of global engagement in collaboration with Oxford University this year.

At LUMUN, we believe in the power of dialogue. For just over two decades, each year young minds have come together to tackle issues of global and contemporary importance. In the process, they learn how to face adversity and difference while celebrating the spirit of negotiation and collaboration. These five days serve as a platform for utilizing real-world knowledge to craft actionable and feasible policy proposals.

But LUMUN is so much more than just a forum for intellectual exchange; it is a community where lasting connections are forged! Now more than ever, as we diversify and internationalise the LUMUN community, we hope to facilitate bonds and create treasured moments for delegates to carry as souvenirs far beyond the conference days. Staffed by over 200 members, our team is dedicated to ensuring that delegates feel welcomed to the vibrant city of Lahore and enjoy a wide array of engaging social and recreational activities, outside their committee rooms.

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With a diverse range of committees – from General Assemblies to Specialized Agencies, Regional Bodies, and the Economic and Social Councils – there is something for everyone at LUMUN. Whether you are new to Model United Nations or a seasoned delegate, you will find a platform that perfectly aligns with your interests.


As we celebrate and expand our ongoing legacy of quality debate, we are committed to making this year's LUMUN more memorable than ever. The Staff and I are thrilled to welcome you to the 21st edition of LUMUN!

Warm Regards,

Laiba Abid

Secretary-General

LUMS Model United Nations XXI



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Under Secretary General



Khudija Munawar

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the 21st edition of LUMUN. As the Under Secretary General for Specialized and Regional Bodies, I am excited to host you at this prestigious event. Currently, I am a sophomore at LUMS, pursuing a major in Anthropology & Sociology (though at the rate this changes, I might graduate with a degree in indecision).

While I am a true parliamentary debater at heart, LUMUN has been instrumental in shaping my appreciation for Model United Nations. From my early days as a middle school delegate at this very conference to now being part of its organizing team, LUMUN has given me countless cherished memories. (Shoutout to Noor Fatima, my best friend, whom I met here as a delegate all those years ago). I hope to deliver an experience that fills you with the same sense of learning and connection that I've been lucky enough to find (I am just a chill guy).

I am confident that each of you will bring your best to the conference, contributing to the high-caliber debate that defines LUMUN. Beyond that, I encourage you to pause and reflect on why you love public speaking. Savor those moments of joy—they will stay with you far longer than any award or title (seriously, those are the core memories TikTok edits are all about).

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
The topics for all regional bodies have been carefully curated, and your chairs and ACDs have worked tirelessly to create an inclusive, enriching environment for debate. I urge you to approach the conference with mutual respect and actively contribute to maintaining a safe, equitable space for all. This is the most fundamental responsibility you owe to one another.

With that (totally not a quarter-life-crisis-inspired) reflection, I wish you the very best for an incredible conference. If you require any help, no matter how big or small, please do not hesitate to reach out to me.

Yours ever,

Khudija Munawar

Under Secretary General | Specialized & Regional Bodies



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Committee Director



Danyal Khan

Dear Delegates,

My name is Danyal Khan and I'll be your Committee Director for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) this year at LUMUN XXI. It is a great pleasure to have you all!

It would be terrible to start off our first session without a solid rapport, so a bit about myself: I'm a Junior at the Mushtaq Gurmani School of Humanities and Social Sciences, majoring in Economics, and I grew up in Athens, Greece.

I've been into public speaking since the age of 3, and according to my family's anecdotes- I used to give fiery speeches, utilizing the unique syntax that gibberish had to offer. Arguably grown since, I have been a part of the LUMS Harvard National Model UN team from 2022-2024, winning the conference two years in a row. I also play for the LUMS Rugby team, and in my free time, I play tennis. I have also just picked up polo!

This year's topic is one that encourages creative problem-solving, and addresses an issue often overlooked in global discourse. I hope that all delegates engage in constructive and thoughtful debate, and value collaboration with each other, making UNSC at LUMUN XXI an enjoyable and lasting experience for everyone present.



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Please don't hesitate to reach out to me! Whether it be questions about MUNs, the topic, or even just to say hello. Always happy to meet and speak with you all! I encourage you to play to your strengths and never to restrict your approach to problem-solving. I wish you all the best of luck with your preparation.

Warmest Regards,
Danyal Khan



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Introduction

At LUMUN 21 UNSC will be a retrospective committee. In the simulation, a channel of communication has been made that allows the member states of the committee to communicate with their past selves, particularly the UNSC 1991/92 panels; which, without any official procedure in place, admitted The Russian Federation as both a permanent member and veto holder. This moment in time where we discuss the accession of a permanent seat is a temporally crucial moment that also opens questions regarding the existence of a permanent seat itself. The purpose of convening here is that essentially this committee can change the present day. The committee must still operate within the limits of the mandate of the UNSC, keeping in mind geopolitical developments which have taken place as a result of the 91/92 UNSC, including but not limited to, the annexation of Crimea, or the Russia-Ukraine war. Effectively, UNSC 24/25 may adopt a different approach to the dissolution of the USSR and its admittance into the P5 as a replacement for Russia, while weighing the various side effects caused by the change.

By extension, this committee is expected to indulge into diplomatic discussion as to how any decision made reflects the UNSC stance

on both permanent members and vetos, This may involve extensive conversations about equity in geopolitics.

History of the Committee

As the principal body in charge of preserving world stability, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is at the forefront of international peace and security. UNSC was created in 1945 by the United Nations Charter and is the only body within the UN whose decisions are legally binding on all member states; the Security Council plays a pivotal role in conflict resolution, crisis management, and the preservation of international order.

The Role and Responsibilities of the UN Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for keeping international peace and security according to the principles and purposes of the United Nations. It investigates disputes or situations that could turn into conflicts and recommends ways to resolve peacefully or

CFR.org Editors, "The UN Security Council," Council on Foreign Relations, Sep. 09, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council>



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terms of settlement. The UNSC also develops strategies for arms control and disarmament and determines if there is a threat to peace or an act of aggression. It can take actions from economic sanctions to military intervention if peaceful measures fail. It also plays key UN administrative roles such as recommending new members, appointing the Secretary-General and electing judges for the International Court of Justice.

The UNSC has unique decision making power within the UN. Under Article 25 of the Charter all UN member states must accept and implement the Council's decisions so its resolutions are binding. This is different from other UN organs which can only make non-binding recommendations. The Council assesses peacekeeping missions on a case by case basis taking into account factors like ceasefires, commitment to political processes, clear mandates and safety assurances for UN personnel. These missions are targeted at specific regional conflicts and are part of the Council's overall goal of maintaining global peace.

"Role of the Security Council," United Nations Peacekeeping.
<http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/role-of-security-council>

Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
"REFERENDUM IN THE SOVIET UNION," 1991. [Online].
Available: <https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Referendum-in-the-Soviet-Union.pdf>

Challenges and Limitations

Despite all its powers, the UNSC has many challenges and limitations. It relies on member states to provide the troops and resources for enforcement actions and that hasn't always been forthcoming. During the Cold War no agreements were made to establish permanent UN forces so it couldn't act decisively in conflicts. (5) Political deadlocks in the Council, especially with the veto power of the 5 permanent members (China, France, Russia, UK and US) often prevent it from responding to crises. (4)

Theatres of Interest

The UNSC operates in many conflict zones around the world. In Africa it deployed peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo to address civil wars and ethnic conflicts. In the Middle East it's involved in conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Palestine seeking political solutions while managing humanitarian crises. It monitors security issues in Europe (Ukraine) and in Asia (Afghanistan, Myanmar and the Korean Peninsula). This is all part of the Council's collective security mandate which means that an attack on one member state is an attack on all.



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This committee specifically will be discussing the matter of the 1991 decision to allocate USSR's Permanent seat to the Russian Federation. The transfer of this seat was carried out with limited deliberation in the midst of geopolitical upheaval. More than three decades later, the global landscape has evolved significantly, marked by emerging powers, shifting alliances, and a legacy of conflicts tied to this historic decision. The mandate of this committee is to evaluate the appropriateness and implications of this 1991 decision.

This committee should assess the justification and precedent, especially consider the legal, political and historical basis for the transfer of the USSR's seat to the Russian Federation. Further, delegates should analyse the impact of this decision on global security, governance, and the effectiveness of the Security council. Finally, determine whether the 1991 allocation should be reaffirmed, amended, or replaced with an alternative that better reflects today's geopolitical realities.

UNSC Crisis Simulation

UNSC 24/25 is a retrospective committee. In the simulation, a channel of communication has been made that allows

the member states of the committee to communicate with their past selves, effectively allowing them to go back in time, and change history. Accordingly, UNSC will follow a rolling crisis format. Hence, delegates are expected to be familiar with the following:

1. Crisis Updates

UNSC will be functioning with Crisis Updates. Crisis Updates serve as interim updates to the general committee about the current situation that the committee is in. The dais will be releasing crisis updates throughout the three days, and the committee's actions will directly impact them.

2. Directives (Public/Private):

Directives are similar to resolutions in traditional committees, with the notable exception that they do not include preambulatory clauses and are much shorter and more concise. Directives are generally written in response to a specific crisis update, and can be as short as two or three clauses, they exist in 2 forms:



2.1. Public Directives

Public Directives are drafted and submitted by a bloc, or the whole committee. They represent a joint action that is being taken by the whole committee to address a crisis update. They are expected to cover every aspect of the crisis, and should be formatted and presented accordingly. Public Directives will serve as the primary form of documentation for UNSC at LUMUN 21.

2.2. Private Directives

Private directives are secret communiques between the dais and the respective delegate sending them. They can be used to put your country/personality's portfolio power into use. Private directives can dictate the action taken by the country, but not its consequence, this is left to the discretion of the dais. In this committee, the floor will remain closed for private directives unless stated otherwise by the secretariat.

2.3. Directive Drafting

Directives must be SMART in nature, that is, Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-Bound, and must cover: Who, When, Where, Why, What

and, How. Public Directives have no specific format, however, in this committee, they must be categorically sorted, with specific clauses numbered and organised, formatting of a draft resolution should be followed.

3.0. Voting Procedure

Voting in UNSC will be carried by placard or, by discretion of the dais, roll call. Any motion requires Simple Majority to be held, and any form of documentation requires 2/3rds majority.

3.1. Veto

A veto refers to a “negative” or “no” vote from a P5 (USA, China, Russia, UK, France) country. Such a no vote would cause any motion on the floor to fail. Veto powers will be enabled throughout the committee's voting process.

Historical Background

The Cold War and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

After the end of World War 2, a prolonged geopolitical and ideological conflict emerged between two contending blocs: the capitalist bloc, consisting of the United States and its allies on one side, and the Socialist bloc, consisting of the Soviet



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Union and other socialist nations and revolutionary movements. The Cold War shaped global politics for decades, with the USSR being a superpower rival to the U.S. in military, technological, and ideological spheres.

By the late 1980s, a growing wave of neoliberalism, sanctions, economic challenges, and growing nationalist movements weakened the Soviet Union. Despite these challenges, a March 1991 referendum supported the USSR's continuity. Approximately 76% of voters across nine republics endorsed the preservation of the Union, albeit with reform proposals. (2)

This showed that while people did want some change, most of the population throughout the republics wanted to preserve the union, compared to the sentiment of liberal nationalists. However, the referendum's result was undermined by Boris Yeltsin, leader of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). In a series of moves aimed at consolidating power, Yeltsin and other republican leaders bypassed the referendum's mandate, effectively dismantling the USSR and creating the Russian Federation. (3)

Geopolitical Context Leading to December 1991

The geopolitical context for the illegal dissolution of the USSR is important for us to understand it. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw mounting economic crises, because of market reforms, declining oil prices, the cost of having to keep up with the US military amongst others. Demands for sovereignty from certain ethnic pockets backed by the US also further fueled tensions. (4)

Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) inadvertently worsened the economic conditions by liberalising the economy, further decreasing living standards and accelerated demands for independence.(5)

In December 1991, the Belavezha Accords, signed by Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, and Belarusian leader Stanislav Shushkevich, proclaimed the dissolution of the USSR, violating the will of the people and the referendum. Gorbachev, who had opposed these actions, resigned as Soviet President on December 25, 1991, marking the USSR's official end.



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The Emergence of Independent States

The dissolution of the USSR resulted in the emergence of 15 independent republics, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. Having been part of the same entity for the past 70 years, these states started having border disputes that laid the foundations for war, such as Azerbaijan-Armenia and the modern-day conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Countries that were part of the same union and believed in the concept of internationalism turned into nationalist countries and created the grounds for ethnic wars to erupt and overall discontent between them.

The Russian Federation as the USSR's Successor

After the USSR's collapse, the Russian Federation positioned itself as the USSR's legal successor. Russia inherited the Soviet Union's embassies, nuclear arsenal, and, crucially, its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). On December 24, 1991, Russia informed the UN that it would assume the USSR's rights and obligations through the Alma-Ata protocols and with the consent of the other former states of the USSR. (6)

The United States' Acceptance of Russia

The U.S. and Western allies quickly accepted Russia as the USSR's successor due to geopolitical pragmatism and the belief that Yeltsin would take Russia down the neoliberal path and not be a threat to the capitalist global order. Russia's vast nuclear arsenal and influence further necessitated engagement, and recognizing Russia would introduce global stability in the global order, as well as avoid the logistical complexities of redistributing the USSR's UNSC seat among the new republics and what the principal should be when a member ceases to exist, ensuring continuity in global governance.

Contemporary Reactions to the Transfer

The decision to grant Russia the USSR's UNSC seat was met with mixed reactions. Russia was viewed as a stabilizing force in the post-Soviet landscape and would stabilize the region. However, there is an argument to be made that it bypassed formal UN procedures and ignored the sovereignty of other former Soviet republics. No proper protocols were followed to establish the



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Russian Federation as a permanent member, and many legalities were excused. (Ibid) Leaders in some newly independent states also expressed concerns about Moscow's disproportionate influence and most importantly the veto power.

The Current Situation

Russia's veto power on the UNSC and its use has been used to protect itself from global actions and reduced the effectiveness of the security council. Steps taken by Russia to expand its influence militarily has called its use into question, especially regarding the conflict in Ukraine. It has been wielded extensively to block resolutions perceived as threatening to its interests, such as sanctions or interventions. The Security Council veto, however, has also been used by other permanent members to protect their own interests, and further destabilise the international situation, as we see the United States using it repeatedly in the Israel-Palestine war. The misuse of the veto has led to accusations of impending global consensus and eroding the UNSC's effectiveness. At the same time, the power dynamics established by the USSR's succession to Russia continue to shape international diplomacy, highlighting unresolved tensions from the Soviet Union's

dissolution. While successful implementation of the Security Council consensus was seen in Libya in 2011, the resolution was accused of being overreached by certain actors who went further than what the resolution allowed for, further creating confusion and distrust between the permanent members regarding the Security Council.

Country Positions and Potential Blocs

United States of America

The United States' stance on the veto power within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is complex and multifaceted, particularly in light of historical developments such as Russia's acquisition of veto power from the Soviet Union. The U.S. has historically defended the veto as a tool for maintaining global stability, yet it has also acknowledged the need for reform to enhance the legitimacy and functionality of the UNSC. (7)

This duality reflects a broader recognition that while the veto can prevent unilateral actions, it can also be used to shield states from accountability, particularly in cases of aggression, as seen in Russia's recent military interventions. (8)



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The U.S. has often found itself at odds with Russia in the UNSC, particularly regarding issues like the Syrian civil war and the annexation of Crimea, where Russia's veto has stymied collective international responses. Moreover, the U.S. has supported the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which allows the General Assembly to act when the Security Council is paralyzed by vetoes. This resolution was notably in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine, highlighting the ongoing tension between the need for decisive action and the constraints imposed by the veto.

In conclusion, the U.S. position on the veto power reflects a balancing act between upholding the principles of international governance and addressing the practical challenges posed by the current structure of the UNSC. (9)(10)

Russian Federation

Russia has consistently utilized its veto power to assert its geopolitical interests, often in opposition to Western-led initiatives. For instance, during the Syrian conflict, Russia vetoed resolutions containing provisions for humanitarian support and protection of civilians, which has drawn criticism from advocates of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

The recent vetoes by Russia, particularly in July 2023, which blocked further imports of UN aid into northwest Syria, exemplify its strategic use of veto power to influence humanitarian outcomes in line with its national interests. This pattern of behavior underscores Russia's broader strategy of leveraging its veto to maintain influence in regions where it perceives a threat to its sovereignty or geopolitical standing. Moreover, Russia's actions in the UNSC reflect a broader narrative of resistance against what it perceives as Western hegemony. The Kremlin has posited its use of the veto as a defense of state sovereignty and a rejection of unilateral interventions that disregard the principles of international law. This perspective is particularly evident in Russia's response to the crises in Ukraine and Syria, where it has positioned itself as a counterbalance to Western interventionist policies, arguing that such actions often exacerbate conflicts rather than resolve them. The invocation of historical grievances and the assertion of a multipolar world order are central to Russia's justification for its veto power, as it seeks to challenge the dominance of Western narratives in international relations. (11)(12)



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G4

The Group of Four (G4)—comprising Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan—has been particularly vocal in advocating for an expansion of the UNSC to include additional permanent members, arguing that this would enhance the Council's legitimacy and effectiveness. However, efforts to reform the veto power itself have faced significant resistance from the P5, who are reluctant to dilute their influence. This resistance highlights a fundamental tension in the UN system: the need for reform to reflect contemporary realities versus the desire of powerful states to maintain their privileged positions. Moreover, France also urged the council to account for the needs of new powers and supports the candidacy of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan as permanent members alongside the increased representation of African States in permanent and non-permanent positions. “Our response to the crisis must not be hindered by divisions in the Council,” Adding that permanent members must voluntarily suspend use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. (13)

China

Historically, China has viewed its veto power as essential for maintaining its

sovereignty and countering Western dominance in global governance. The UNSC's structure, which allows for the exercise of veto power, is seen by China as a necessary safeguard against unilateral actions that may undermine its national interests or those of its allies. For instance, during the Syrian crisis, China, alongside Russia, utilized its veto power to block resolutions that it perceived as infringing on state sovereignty and promoting foreign intervention, which they argue undermines the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. This pattern of behavior illustrates China's commitment to a multipolar world order, where it can assert its influence alongside Russia, particularly in opposition to the United States. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia's re-emergence as a global power has led to a strategic partnership with China, characterized by coordinated actions in the UNSC. Both nations have frequently aligned their vetoes, reflecting a shared interest in counterbalancing Western influence. There is a growing consensus among emerging powers, including those in the BRICS grouping, that the current structure of the UNSC, particularly the veto power, requires reform to better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. China advocates for a



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more equitable representation in the UNSC, arguing that the current configuration disproportionately favors Western powers and does not adequately represent the interests of developing nations. (14)(15)

South Africa

South Africa believes that the veto power held by the five permanent members obstructs reforms to make the council more representative of the modern world. South Africa advocates for two permanent seats and either abolishing the veto or extending it to new members*. Resistance to reform stems from power dynamics and reluctance by current permanent members to share influence. South Africa and other developing nations are urged to unite in pushing for change. (16)

Timeline of significant events

1946–1950s: Early Cold War Vetoes

1946–1955 - During the early Cold War the Soviet Union used its veto 75 times to block resolutions in favour of Western aligned policies. These vetoes reflected ideological rivalries as the USSR opposed

resolutions targeting communist states or its allies. This prevented consensus on issues from post war reconstruction to anti-communist measures and established the veto as a key tool of geo-political competition. (17)

1960s: Decolonization and Regional Conflicts

- **1963 (South Africa – Apartheid):**

As the world was getting increasingly opposed to apartheid the UN tried to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. The UK and US vetoed these measures, citing their economic interests and strategic presence in the region. This delay in taking action allowed apartheid to continue for longer and undermined global efforts to address systemic racial injustice. (18)

1970s: Middle East and Southern Africa

- **1972 (Israel-Palestine):**

After the 1967 Six-Day War Israel occupied Palestinian territories and the UN called for a condemnation.



The US vetoed for the first time ever a resolution condemning Israel. The US became the sole defender of Israel and the Council was unable to address the Palestinian issue. (19)

- 1974 (Cyprus Crisis)

After Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus the UN tried to mediate. But the USSR vetoed resolutions against Turkey and aligned itself with the Cold War rivalries. The veto prolonged the international inaction and the Cyprus issue was left unresolved. (21)

- 1977 (Apartheid in South Africa)

As the anti-apartheid movements grew the calls for arms embargoes and economic sanctions increased. The US and UK vetoed again and prioritized economic interests and Cold War alliances. This vetoed the international pressure on South Africa and delayed the end of apartheid. (22)

1980s: Intensified US-Soviet Rivalries

- 1981 (Israel-Palestine):

The UNSC proposed a resolution urging Israel to withdraw from the occupied Golan Heights, captured in 1967. The US vetoed the resolution, maintaining its unwavering support for Israel. This move hindered progress toward resolving territorial disputes in the Middle East. (19)

1990s: Post-Cold War Realignments

- 1997 (Guatemala):

China vetoed a resolution to extend the UN mission in Guatemala due to political tensions between China and Guatemala. This showed that vetoes can be used for bilateral interests not global peace. (23)

- 1999 (Kosovo):

Russia and China vetoed resolutions authorizing NATO led intervention in Kosovo, against external interference. This prevented UNSC backed intervention and led to



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NATO taking military action without UNSC approval, setting a precedent for bypassing the Security Council. (24)

- Kashmir issue:

During the Cold War, resolutions on Kashmir were often blocked in the UNSC, mainly due to Cold War alliances. The USSR vetoed several proposals in favor of Pakistan, as it was close to India. This use of veto power kept the Kashmir issue unresolved for decades and it remains a major point of tension between India and Pakistan. (25)

2000s: Middle East Dominates

- 2002 (Iraq War):

US and UK threatened to veto any resolution opposing the invasion of Iraq. Unable to get UNSC authorization, the coalition invaded outside of international law and further undermined the Council's authority. (26)

- 2006 (Lebanon-Israel Conflict):

US vetoed ceasefire resolutions. Conflict continued, many civilians killed and infrastructure destroyed in Lebanon. (19)

2010s: Complex Geopolitical Divides

- 2011 (Syrian Civil War):

Russia and China started vetoing resolutions condemning the Assad regime, imposing sanctions or authorizing intervention. These vetoes let the crisis escalate and the region to suffer and destabilize. (27)

- 2014 (Crimea/Russia-Ukraine Conflict):

Russia vetoed resolutions condemning its annexation of Crimea, saying it was protecting the Russian speaking population. This veto showed the UNSC can't act against a P5 member, undermining its credibility. (28)



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- 2019 (Venezuela Crisis):

Russia and China vetoed resolutions calling for international intervention in Venezuela's political crisis. These vetoes meant they supported the Maduro government and took no collective action, making the crisis worse.

2020s: Escalating Global Tensions

- 2022 (Russia-Ukraine Invasion):

Russia vetoed a resolution condemning its invasion of Ukraine, proving once again the UNSC is impotent when it comes to conflicts involving its permanent members. (28)

- 2023 (Middle East):

US vetoed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid during a Gaza conflict, consistent with its long history of supporting Israel. This veto blocked international action on humanitarian issues and escalated the situation. (20)

Possible Solutions and Strategies

Legitimizing the Succession Process from the USSR to the Russian Federation.

By endorsing the process that has happened already and reaffirming the right of the Russian Federation to the seat of the USSR, the committee can set a precedent for parts of a country to take the role of a state that has stopped existing. This would be following the status quo and ensuring that there is little to no change in the world's current system. Any future scenarios of succession for countries follow the same model.

Reassessing Russia's appropriation of the USSR's seat

By calling into question the action of allowing Russia to adopt the seat of the USSR, the committee can prevent the Russian Federation from becoming a permanent member and either abolish the 5th permanent seat, put it to a vote for the General Assembly, or distribute it between



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the former Soviet Republics. (ibid)

Limiting the veto power for the permanent members

Reducing the veto power of the permanent members to situations itself is not involved in, or that a singular veto requires other members as well to agree with them, would prevent Russia from using it to protect itself, as well as the other Permanent members. (17)

Removing the veto power for the permanent members

By removing all rights to the veto in the Security Council and making sure every resolution adopted is only through the majority of a two-thirds majority to reflect global dynamics better.

Expanding the permanent members to the council and overall increasing the size

This would allow the Security Council to better reflect the current situation of the world, compared to when the original Security Council was founded, reducing the power of singular members in the council. (18)

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

1. What criteria determine a state's eligibility for permanent membership in the UNSC?
2. Should the Russian Federation remain the successor state to the USSR in the UNSC?
Should other states have a say? Should it be a global vote?
3. How should the UNSC address the interests of other former Soviet states?
4. What mechanisms can ensure the fairness and inclusivity of any proposed changes?
5. How would changes to UNSC membership affect the global power balance and international law?
6. Is veto essential for an effective UNSC?
7. Should the veto power even exist for a state that doesn't exist anymore?
8. How does the veto power change from the ROC to the PRC factor in and can that precedent be used?
9. What factors make a country eligible to gain a permanent seat, and what actions maintain it?



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